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SUMMARY 
The public, by its reception and patronage of the widening Concorde supersonic 
service, will dictate whether a need exists for a second-generation supersonic 
transport. As of this writing, this need has not been demonstrated unequivocal- 
ly; however, preliminary results are favorable . . . the public is willing to 
patronize supersonic service, even at premium fares, with-marginal schedule 
frequency, and in less than spacious accomnodations. 
Without question, a second generation supersonic transport must meet society's 
needs, and at the same time be profitable for the operators and manufacturers, 
or such a program should not be initiated, Studies indicate that a design 
meeting the requirements can be described; however, unlike major civil aircraft 
developments of the past, an advanced supersonic transport cannot be conceived 
that would be economically competitive for all airline long haul passenger 
markets. The supersonic airplane direct op=ting costs (DOC) seem inherently 
higher than subsonic designs, both as envisioned today and for the foreseeable 
future. Accordingly, no case can be made for an AST to compete for the excursion 
traveler, who is economy minded and sees no economic value to increased speed. 
A very large segment of the over water, long haul passenger market, 31% of the 
passengers who provide 42% of the passenger revenue, offers a significant 
market for an advanced supersonic transport. This is for both the first class 
and full-fare economy passenger markets. The supersonic transport may be more 
competitive here in spite of lower costs of subsonic transports, as passenger 
preference is a more powerful variable than DOC. This latter fact was amply 
demonstrated in the late fifties when the jets completely replaced the 
reciprocating engine transports on most world routes, in spite of slightly 
higher fares. 
The civil aircraft market, through the year 2000, could reach 250 to 300 super- 
sonic aircraft, given the timely availability of the necessary resources to 
undertake such a venture. Every indication to date is that a multi-nation, 
multi-government program may offer the only way such a program will come to 
fruition. 
BACKGROUND 
The North Atlantic air market, historically, has dominated world airline 
passenger markets, and a great deal can be learned from studying its operation. 
The market share split by mode started in 1959 with the initial offering of 
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less-than-first-class fares. The response was overwhelmingly favorable and a 
large increase in passenger travel occurred. International air travel became 
the largest sustained growth segment in the airline industry (fig. 1). 
The impact on the first class market is a fact well known to all airplane 
designers, as the bulkhead between the first class section and the lower fare 
passengers was moved- forward in the airplane. This seemed to occur almost 
every time new data was available on the latest split between first class and 
economy. 1975 data shows first class is about 5.8% of the North Atlantic 
scheduled passenger traffic (fig. 2). Finally, some stability to the market 
split seems to have been reached. 
A look at the fares (fig. 3) shows how extensive these reduced fares have 
become. The cheapest, the excursion fares,are only 30% of the first class 
ticket, whereas there was but one fare 25 years ago. Another interesting 
comparison can be made using the growth of the consumer price index (CPI). 
Here, the excursion fare is but 20% of what inflation alone, as reflected by 
the CPI, would have driven the fare to, and the first class fare is also low, 
being 30% below the CPI trend line. These are facts little recognized by scme 
regulators or critics of the airline industry. Airline travel remains one of 
the best buys. in the recently inflated economies of the world. 
Unfortunately, good historical data are not available on the full-fare economy 
passenger market, but there are data for the first class passenger market 
(fig. 4). In spite of the surge in tourist and economy traffic, the first class 
market has continued to be a growing market. Since 1963, for 12 years, it has 
grown at almost 9% per year, a surprisingly healthy figure. One would expect 
that the full-fare economy class would have grown even faster than the 9% growth 
of first class. 
High fare business will always be attractive (fig. 5). An analysis of the PAA 
and TWA data shows that these airlines in 1975 realized about the same revenue 
from first class than from their more heavily publicized charter business. And 
to realize this they handled only l/4 as many passengers. 
ANALYSIS 
Initially, in the market analysis conducted in 1973 (fig. 6) in the NASA contract 
effort, McDonnell Douglas examined more than 500 city-pairs throughout the world 
for supersonic service for the period 1985-1994 considering 12 world market 
groups such as North Atlantic, Europe-Mid-East, and North and Central Pacific. 
The initial city-pairs met the following qualifications: overwater routes 
(some tag-end city-pairs were included for joining traffic), minimum city-pair 
distance of 1667 km (900 miles) and all city-pairs capable of generating suffi- 
cient passenger traffic during the period 1985-2,909 to suppo,rt scheduled super- 
sonic service. An iterative process of computer-aided market analysis was 
undertaken for these combined world market groups in which market growth rates 
were projected from the base year 1975 to the year 2009. The supersonic revenue 
passenger-kilometers (passenger-miles) are estimated to grow from 87 billion 
(47 billion) in 1980 to 261 billion (141 billion) by the year 2000. This is a 
5.7 percent average annual growth rate over the forecast period. 
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The resulting revenue passenger-mile distribution by range is shown. The impor- 
tance of being able to design a 8334-kilometer (4500-nautical-mile) range air- 
plane to do 83 percent of the business as compared to 6112 kilometers (3300 
nautical miles) or 40 percent of that business is most significant. Both the 
Concorde and the last U.S. SST were designed for the shorter range. T:ie ad- 
vanced technology capabilities identified during the past 4 years in the 
cooperative NASA/McDonnel Douglas design studies show that a 8334-kilometer 
(4590-nautical-mile) range can be realized. As civil aircraft manufacturers 
knop, well, airlines like long range. The value of range cannot be under esti- 
mated in international service. 
A comparison is shown of the payload range capabilities of the various important 
supersonic transport programs as compared to typical city-pair distances (fig. 7). 
The Concorde and the former U.S. SST both show limited range as compared to what 
can be predicted for an advanced supersonic transport as a result of the 
cooperative NASA-Industry SCAR efforts of the past four years. 
The payload range shows a 851 Skilometer (46!lO-nautical-mile)ca?ability for a 
near term airplane, for a go-ahead in 1983 w!lic!l would use a low risk enqine 
cycle. Also shown is what could be done with an advanced engine (possibly a 
variable cycle engine) plus a moderate use of composites both for secondary 
structures and for reinforcing the primary structure for this otherwise metal 
airplane. A range of 10,556 kilometers (5700 nautical miles) is possible, 
which approc:ies t!ie maximum ranges flown today by subsonic aircraft, which 
seemingly k!ould satisfy future range requirements for a supersonic transport. 
Opening up the Pacific can become a reality and supersonic travel there can be 
especially appealing. Also shown is a 225-passenger design somewhat smaller 
than the DC-lo-30 size used for the tlcDonnel1 Douglas baseline supersonic 
transport at 273 passengers. This seems to be a better size to match tile 
passenger demand as a result of recently completed market trend studies. This 
subject of passenger size is discussed later in this paper. 
Direct operating costs (fig. 8) in 1976 dollars have been recalculated since 
published 1973 results to include recent inflation both in manufacturing costs 
and in fuel costs. The results show a deterioration in direct operating costs 
of a 273 passenger supersonic aircraft as compared to a DC-10-30; however, the 
loss is not as great as many predict. Today, the supersonic aircraft direct 
operating cost is predicted to be 55% higher than for a DC-lo-30 in similar 
seating configurations. In this comparison, in the prices used, there is a 
prdfit included in the supersonic aircraft airplane price as well as the cost of 
the money, whereas the DC-lo-30 price has yet to reflect a profit. Direct opera- 
ting cost of the Concorde is also shown for reference. A number of sensitivity 
studies have been made regarding increased jet fuel prices. Fuel cost accounts 
for a major fraction of the operating cost. The effect on ,the supersonic airplane 
of an increase in fuel cost from 12 to 35 cents per gallon, an increase of almost 
200 percent in the cost of fuel, has been included in these cost comparisons. 
This impact is not as dramatic as one might expect, Looking to the future, we 
predict that increased labor expenses will have a greater impact on operating 
costs, for both subsonic and supersonic airplanes, than fuel expenses. 
The total operating costs (fig, 9) show a better picture for the 273 passenger 
MDC supersonic transport, being only 28% higher than the DC-10-30. Again, the 
Concorde is shown for reference. 
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Today, the Concorde is providing the passenger with a tangible benefit for in- 
creased fare (fig. 10). This is the saving of travel time with the increase in 
usefulness that shorter travel time affords. Subsonic aircraft offer amenities, 
deluxe service and extra spaciousness , as the only inducements for higher fares. 
To the average business executive this is not sufficient except in unique 
instances as the economy section is quite good enough and both sections arrive 
together at the destination. The Concorde has changed this. 
It is very possible that the supersonic airplane of the 1980's will follow this 
lead and afford special value to the traveler, whether first class or full-fare 
economy. The discounted fares require low operating cost airplanes and, accord- 
ingly, the subsonic DC-10 type transports will continue to carry this type of 
passenger. Additionally, increased capacity subsonic transports are now on the 
drawing boards that offer even lower seat mile costs making the supersonic 
transport economics even less attractive for purely economy minded passengers._ 
In analyzing the 1974 North Atlantic yield per passenger nautical mile (fig. 11), 
it is readily apparent that the first class yield of over 3.1 cents/seat kilo- 
meter (15 cents/seat mile) far exceeds the yield of the other segments of the 
market. It is 75% higher than full-fare economy class and over 2-l/2 times as 
high as the 22-45 day excursion yield. It is also significant that the yield of 
full-fare economy class is 50% higher than for the 22-45 day excursion. 
To put yield in perspective, the total operating costs shown earlier (fig. 9) 
were 1.9 cents/seat kilometer (3.5 cents/seat mile) for the DC-lC)-30 and 2.4 
cents/seat kilometer (4.4 cents/seat mile) for the MDC-AST in 1976 dollars. 
Also, the Concorde was shown at about 4.3 cents/seat kilometer (8 cents/seat 
mile) or about twice the DC-lo-3q. These total operating costs are well under 
the yield of first class and, in the case of the MDC-AST and DC-19-33, well 
under the full-fare econom;/; however, the DC-lo-30 alone of the three looks 
attractive for the discounted fare low yield passenger market. 
The North Atlantic market share that seems to be important for a supersonic 
airplane (fig. 12) can be roughly estimated to be 19% of the passengers who 
provide 27% of the revenue. ' The remaining 81% of the passengers would continue 
to be served by subsonic transports. Not all of the full-fare economy passengers 
can be expected to patronize supersonic service due to schedule problems, lack 
of traffic density, or other reasons. 
In the McDonnell Douglas in-house studies, various market penetrations for 
supersonic travelhave been investigated (fig. 13). Each city-pair seems to 
require a different penetration assumption, dictated by the historical market 
split between business and pl 
penetration range from a low 
Los Angeles market, to heavil. 
de Janeiro at 40%. 
There are market penetration 
easure travel. Typical assumptions for market 
of 17% from the recreation dominated Honolulu to 
y business dominated routes like New York to Rio 
variations by service and by fare for supersonic 
service (fig. 14). One Concorde manufacturer varies market penetration with 
the ratio of total operating cost relative to competitive subsonic designs. To 
that basic curve can be added the values being used by McDonnell Douglas on some 
in-house studies. These values for the supersonic airplane are 90% penetration 
for the first class market, 50% for the full-fare economy market and zero 
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penetration for the discount market. It can be seen that on this basis the 
Concorde penetration will be small relative to what can be offered in a more 
economical second-generation supersonic transport, with low total operating 
costs. 
One route was examined in detail, the North Atlantic (fig. 15). For this exam- 
ple, two cases were postulated. Case one assumed the DC-lo-30 carried all the 
passenger traffic and realized the revenue just as it existed by class for the 
1974;scheduled services offered. 1975 operating cost assumptions were used. The 
system resulted in a breakeven load factor of 43 percent for an all DC-10 fleet. 
The second case assumed the traffic to split as described earlier. Initially, 
the airplane seating capacities did not match the traffic demand and the passenger 
split of both aircraft had to be tailored to match the markets. The 10% first 
class penetration for the DC-lo-30 resulted in only one first class passenger 
per flight in the subsonic airplane so a high density 328 seat DC-lo-30 was 
selected. The supersonic airplane on the other hand could not accomnodate all 
the first class passengers of the market and accordingly a 35% first class 
65% full-fare economy split had to be obtained. The 273 seat MDC supersonic 
design fuselage became a 251 seat design to match the split in the market 
between first class and 50% of the full-fare economy. 
The load factors that resulted, assuminq no change to the 1974 fares levels, 
showed that the supersonic design at 35% load factor not only was competitive 
but was even slightly better than the all subsonic case. This is extremely 
important as it shows that a supersonic airplane can be a profitable investment 
for an airline and does not need fare increases to support it. Also, a 251 
passenger airplane may actually be too large, 225 passengers may be better. 
While there is every reason to believe that a fleet of supersonic airplanes can 
be operated by the airlines with no increase in fares (fig. 16) for first class 
or full-fare economy, indications are that a small increase in fares for all 
services can be tolerated without a loss in market share. This would increase 
the profitability of the entire airline system. 
As of now, our market trend studies indicate that a 225 passenger supersonic 
airplane may better match the anticipated passenger demands through the year 
2000. A typical interior arrangement is shown (fig. 17). which has 77 passengers 
in first class and 148 passengers in full-fare economy, almost all arranged in 
spacious 4 abreast accommodations. 
McDonnell Douglas/NASA 1973 studies, more conservative than either Boeing or 
Lockheed, showed a large potential market for an advanced supersonic airplane 
from the mid-1980's to the end of the century. Present estimates (fig. 18) are 
that 250 to 300 aircraft would still be needed through the year 2000, even 
making allowances for high fuel costs and higher operating costs. Assuming a 
purchase price of approximately $110 million per airplane, this represents a 
$33 billion market. 
$42 billion 
This is almost equivalent to the total free-world value - 
- of all the civil aircraft sales in history up through 1976. This 
is an important market and the U.S. should try to capture a major part of it. 
989 
The future requirement for subsonic aircraft for these same over water long 
range routes is close to 700 DC-10-30's (or equivalent) to put the supersonic 
transport market in perspective. 
H look at the history of one U.S. civil aircraft program (fig. 19) seems to 
portray how the second-generation supersonic airplane program could develop. 
Both represent non-competitive major airplane programs designed to serve the 
long haul passenger on the prime routes of the world. Only time will tell if 
history will once again repeat itself. 
990 
6 
NUMBER OF REVENUE 4 
PASSENGERS 
(MILLIONS) 3 
SOURCE: IATA 
C 
100 
80 
SCHEDULED 60 
PASSENGER 
TRAFFIC 
(%) 40 
20 
0 
SOURCE: CAB 
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 
YEAR 
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Figure 2.- Market share by mode - North Atlantic. 
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Figure 4.- History - 1st class market - North Atlantic. 
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Figure 12.- Market shares - North Atlantic. 
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Figure 13.- Typical market penetrations. 
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Figure 16.- Airline fare options for North Atlantic case. 
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Figure 17.- 225 passenger AST. 
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Figure 18.- Passengers by aircraft type, 1980-2000. 
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